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The Offence/Defence of Infanticide: A View from Two Perspectives 
Helen Howard* 
Abstract: 
This article asks whether the time is right for abolition of the offence/defence of 
infanticide. To this end, a two-pronged approach is taken, examining infanticide 
initially as an offence, and then as a defence. In terms of the offence of infanticide, 
consideration is given to both the concept of the 'infanticidal mother’, as well as to 
the status of infants below the age of 12 months. When considering the defence of 
infanticide, examination is made of the exclusive nature of the defence and of the 
scope for an individual to be a ‘partial’ moral agent. The contradictory nature of 
infanticide, being both inculpatory and exculpatory, suggests the need for a 
theoretical rationale that justifies disallowing the offence/defence to, inter alia, those 
women who kill their own children over 12 months and to men who suffer similar 
‘environmental’ postnatal depression. It is suggested that women who kill their 
children while suffering from the ‘after-effects’ of childbirth are either, depending on 
the severity of mental disorder, fully competent and therefore criminally responsible 
(although perhaps entitled to a lesser sentence due to a reduction in culpability) or 
fully incompetent, therefore incurring no criminal responsibility at all. This proposal 
can be achieved by recognising that there is a place for reduced culpability or a 
complete absence of responsibility to fall within the current defence of diminished 
responsibility or within the Law Commission’s recommended alternative to the 
insanity defence of ‘not criminally responsible by reason of recognised medical 
condition’. 
                                                          
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Teesside University. The author is indebted to Dr Cath Crosby for her comments on an 
earlier draft. 
   
 
2 
 
Keywords: infanticide, criminal responsibility, mental disorder 
INTRODUCTION 
The ‘Janus-faced’1 offence/defence of infanticide is in as much need of 
reform/abolition as when it was considered by the Law Commission more than a 
decade ago.2 Despite dealing with one of the ‘most disquieting’3 types of criminal 
behaviour, the offence/defence of infanticide offers an ideal opportunity to test 
competing needs within the criminal justice system. With the offence/defence of 
infanticide uniquely inculpating at the same time as exculpating, the harm caused to 
the victim must be balanced against the culpability of the defendant. Given the 
defencelessness of the victim and the extreme vulnerability of some defendants 
however, alongside often salacious media scrutiny,4 a perfect balance may be 
impossible to achieve and the time may be right to abandon the offence/defence 
entirely. What is clear to academics5 and the judiciary is that ‘[t]he law relating to 
infanticide is unsatisfactory and outdated.’6 
 
The offence of infanticide is a lesser charge to murder set out under s.1(1) of the 
Infanticide Act 1938. Alternatively, it may be pleaded as a defence under s.1(2) of 
the same Act. This offence/defence allows the mother who kills her child below the 
age of 12 months, the balance of her mind being disturbed by reason of her not 
having fully recovered from the birth or her still suffering the effects of lactation, to 
                                                          
1 A Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in Criminal Law (OUP: Oxford, 2012), 226.  
2 Law Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales (LCCP: London, 2005), 177. 
3 R Ogle and D Maier-Katkin, ‘A Rationale for Infanticide Laws’ (1993) Criminal Law Review 903 at 903. 
4 See e.g. https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3836124/mum-rachel-tunstill-stabbed-baby-to-death-jailed-for-
life/. Compare https://www.2br.co.uk/news/local-news/2308772/woman-accepts-she-killed-her-baby-but-
says-she-had-no-memory-of-doing-so/ (accessed on 17 July 2018). 
5 See e.g. Loughnan, above n.1; C Wells, ‘The Impact of Feminist Thinking on Criminal Law and Justice: 
Contradiction, Complexity, Conviction and Connection’ [2004] Criminal Law Review 88; K Brennan, ‘Traditions 
of English Liberal Thought: a History of the Enactment of an Infanticide Law in Ireland’ [2013] Irish Jurist 100. 
6 Per Judge LJ in R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA Crim 1092 at [140]. 
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evade the mandatory life sentence for murder.7 The offence/defence is intended to 
offer a more merciful outcome8 for the defendant than diminished responsibility, 
especially given that it can avoid the distress to the mother of an initial charge of 
murder or a voluntary manslaughter conviction. Wider than the defence of 
diminished responsibility, with infanticide there is no requirement that the defendant 
be suffering from a clinical disorder, nor that a causal link be shown between the 
disturbed balance of mind and the killing.9 While the offence/defence is rarely used,10 
and was developed historically as a compassionate alternative to capital punishment 
for those ‘illegitimate mothers’ who killed their new-born infants in desperation, one 
view which will be examined and rejected is that infanticide is still relevant today,11 
although in need of updating. 
 
Recent cases demonstrate that the offence/defence of infanticide is still in use. In 
June 2017, Rachel Tunstill was given a life sentence for the murder of her new-born 
baby, with a minimum term of 20 years imprisonment. Tunstill gave birth in secret 
and claimed to have no memory of the killing. Furthermore, medical evidence 
suggested she was suffering from an acute stress reaction, set against a background 
of mental disorder, including severe depression and Asperger’s Syndrome.12 This 
case was unusual in that the majority of women who kill their new-born infants are 
found guilty of, or succeed in, the defence of infanticide and rarely receive custodial 
                                                          
7 S.1(1) Infanticide Act 1938. 
8 Brennan describes it as ‘a more compassionate route’: K Brennan, ‘Beyond the Medical Model: a Rationale 
for Infanticide Legislation’ (2007) 58 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 505, 534. 
9 C.f. s.2 of the Homicide Act 1957 as amended by s.52(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 in which the 
abnormality of normal mental functioning must provide an explanation for the killing. 
10 Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006) No 304 at paras. D.6-D20: 49 cases during 
the period 1990-2003.  
11 Above n.3 at 903. This view is supported by the Law Commission, see above n.10 at para. 9.27. 
12 Court of Appeal, Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment, 19 July 2018, at paras. [9] and [28]-[29]. 
   
 
4 
 
sentences.13 In July 2018, the Court of Appeal quashed Tunstill’s conviction for 
murder on the grounds that infanticide was not left to the jury and, given the 
conflicting medical evidence, ordered a re-trial.14 A striking comparison can be made 
with the sentencing of Orsolya-Anamaria Balogh who, in July 2016,15 gave birth to 
her son in secret, cut the umbilical cord, stuffed tissues in his mouth and left him in a 
bin. The baby survived. Pleading guilty to attempted infanticide, Balogh was given a 
12 month community order. The order was lifted in May 2017 so that she could leave 
the country in order to rebuild her relationship with her son. In the absence of trial 
transcripts and an insight into jury deliberations, it is impossible to say whether the 
discrepancy in the original outcomes between the above two cases was justified, nor 
can a prediction be made as to the likely outcome of Tunstill’s re-trial. However, in 
light of these two decisions, questions need to be raised as to whether the 
offence/defence of infanticide allows for too lenient treatment of women who take or 
attempt to take the life of another human being, or whether a vulnerable woman who 
may have given birth alone and in secret should be treated so harshly by being 
found guilty of the murder of her child. 
 
This article will examine infanticide in two parts; in respect of the infanticide offence, 
first, criticism will be made of an offence which creates the ‘infanticidal woman’16 in 
the criminal law, and which bases criminal responsibility on the existence of a 
disturbance of the mind.17 Also, in considering infanticide as an offence, a challenge 
will be made regarding the lack of reverence paid by the criminal justice system to 
                                                          
13 Above n.10 at paras. D.6-D20.  
14 The jury rejected the defence of diminished responsibility. Above n.12 at para. [13]. 
15 http://www.wigantoday.net/news/woman-who-dumped-her-baby-in-hospital-bin-to-be-allowed-home-1-
8544284 (accessed 9 July 2018). 
16 Above n.1 219. 
17 Ibid. 
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the sanctity of life. The proposition will be made that the life of an infant under 12 
months is, by virtue of the infanticide offence, given less value than that of any other 
human being and that such a view should not be tolerated in today's society. 
 
The second part of this article will examine infanticide as a defence. In particular, the 
argument will be made that, as with diminished responsibility,18 a defence ought not 
to recognise a reduced level of criminal responsibility – either a person is responsible 
or she is not.19 Rather, recognition should be given to a reduced level of culpability, 
but, in paying proper respect to the sanctity (and equality) of all lives, this recognition 
should only be given where a causal link is shown between the disturbance of the 
mind and the killing. In fact, where culpability is shown to be significantly reduced, it 
may be preferable to accept that there is no criminal responsibility at all. Finally, 
consideration will be given to the recommendations made by the Law Commission in 
its Discussion Paper on Insanity and Automatism20 which may provide a better 
solution to the continued existence of the offence/defence of infanticide. It will be 
suggested that, applying Hart’s capacity theory,21 a defence of not criminally 
responsible by reason of recognised medical condition could be broad enough in 
scope to protect the woman who kills her child in circumstances where she lacked 
the capacity to choose to do otherwise.  
 
THE OFFENCE OF INFANTICIDE 
                                                          
18 See H Howard, ‘Diminished Responsibility, Culpability and Moral Agency’ in Mental Condition Defences and 
the Criminal Justice System: Perspectives from Law and Medicine, eds. Livings, Reed and Wake (Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing: Newcastle upon Tyne, 2015) 318-338. 
19 Ibid, 326. 
20 Law Commission Discussion Paper, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism (2013). 
21 ‘Fairness require[s] that a man should not be punished…unless he had the capacity and a fair opportunity to 
avoid doing the thing for which he is punished.’ H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (OUP: Oxford, 1968) 
190-191. 
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The ‘gender-specific’22 crime of infanticide is targeted solely at women who have 
given birth within the previous 12 months. Infanticide may be charged as an offence 
where the mens rea for murder is present and a woman kills her child under the age 
of one year. Section 1(1) of the Infanticide Act 193823 states:  
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child 
being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or 
omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having 
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the 
effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, if the 
circumstances were such that but for this Act the offence would have 
amounted to murder or manslaughter, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of 
infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had 
been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the child. 
 
The Infanticide Act 1922, a precursor to the current statute, was introduced as a 
result of general opinion being against treating infants killed by their mothers as 
victims of an ‘ordinary’ murder.24 Reasons as to why the killing of an infant under 12 
months has been regarded as less reprehensible are: an infant cannot suffer the 
same as an adult victim;25 the loss to its family is less;26 the sense of insecurity 
caused to society is lower;27 and the responsibility of the mother is reduced due to 
                                                          
22 E Cunliffe, ‘Infanticide: Legislative History and Current Questions’ [2009] Criminal Law Quarterly 94 at 94. 
23 As amended by s.57 Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
24 D Ormerod & K Laird, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal law (14th ed., OUP: Oxford, 2015) 679. 
25 Ibid. 
26 J Keown, ‘Surveying the Foundations of Medical Law: a Reassessment of Glanville Williams’s the Sanctity of 
Life and the Criminal Law’ (2008) Medical Law Review 85 at 102-103, citing Williams, The Sanctity of Life and 
the Criminal Law (Alfred A Knopf, 1957) 29-30. 
27 Ibid. 
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the disturbance of her mind.28 While it is undoubtedly correct that the insecurity 
caused to society is lower, it is suggested that the other reasons should be open to 
challenge: all lives in being are considered equal before the law;29 the loss of a child 
to any family is entirely subjective; and it is culpability, not responsibility, which is 
reduced.30  
 
Furthermore, the omission of the need for a causal link between the mother suffering 
from the after effects of childbirth or lactation and the actual killing means that certain 
women may kill their infants and escape the full force of a murder or voluntary 
manslaughter conviction. If the disturbance of the mind did not cause the killing, then 
a reduction in culpability seems inappropriate. 
 
Most cases result from a guilty plea to the offence, and are accepted as such where 
there is evidence of emotional disturbance at the time of the offence.31 Where a 
woman is found guilty of infanticide, the tendency has been to deal with her 
leniently,32 the assumption being that she must not have been in her right mind at the 
time of the killing. Within this assumption, two equally incorrect views have emerged: 
either the mother who kills her infant must be mad, as she would not otherwise have 
acted contrary to her instinct;33 or, worse, all women who have recently given birth 
are mad.34 
                                                          
28 Above n.24, 680. 
29 See Ward LJ’s comments in Re A [2000] 4 All ER 961, 1000: ‘What the sanctity of life doctrine compels me to 
accept is that each life has inherent value in itself and the right to life, being universal, is equal for all of us.’ 
30 Above n.18, 326. 
31 R D Mackay, ‘The Consequences of Killing Very Young Children’ [1993] Crim LR 21. 
32 See above n.10. During a research period of 1990-2003, of a sample of 49 defendants convicted of 
infanticide, only three defendants were given custodial sentences. 
33 Wells, above n.5 at 99; A Morris and A Wilczynski ‘Parents who Kill Their Children’ (1993) Crim LR 31 at 36. 
34 Above n.3 at 904; Brennan, n.5 at 124. 
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The inclusive nature of the offence and the ‘infanticidal’ mother 
Loughnan comments that ‘a finding of partial responsibility for killing (whether in 
conviction for a charge or in the acceptance of a plea) flows straightforwardly from 
the construction of the act of infanticide as an instantiation of abnormality.’35 Thus, a 
mother who kills must be suffering from a mental disorder as no ‘normal’ mother 
would behave in this way.36 No allowance is made here for that fact that a woman 
may kill for reasons other than an imbalance of the mind. A lack of willingness to 
embark on motherhood, a desire for career progression, a failure of contraception, or 
the breakdown of a relationship could also be influencing factors. In allowing a 
conviction for infanticide with no causal link, a ‘mere temporal connection’37 being 
required, a message is sent to all mothers that they must either be good mothers or 
mentally disturbed. Thus, ‘[t]he paradigm of good motherhood includes the myth of 
maternal instinct’38 and anyone who deviates from this path by killing her child is 
presumed to be ‘mad’.39 
 
A more extreme view is that ‘[r]unning parallel with the glorified role of motherhood, 
both supporting and undermining it, has been the increased medicalisation and 
institutionalisation of reproduction and infant development.’40 The medicalised 
approach to motherhood arguably creates a presumption41 that all women are 
                                                          
35 Above n.1 219. 
36 J Grossman, ‘Postpartum Psychosis- a Defense to Criminal Responsibility or Just Another Gimmick?’ [1990] 
University of Detroit Law Review 311 at 315. 
37 A Loughnan, ‘The ‘Strange’ Case of the Infanticide Doctrine’ (2012) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 685 at 
702. 
38 Wells, above n.5 at 99. 
39 Morris and Wilcyzynski, above n.33 at 36. 
40 Wells, above n.5 at 99. 
41 Above n.3 at 904. 
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mentally unstable after giving birth and this presumption is underpinned by the fact 
that a causal link is not required for the offence to be made out. This medicalisation 
of infanticide has been viewed as promoting the view that ‘all women are inherently 
mentally unstable as a result of their biological functions’.42 At the same time, the 
medicalisation of infanticide effectively ignores the social issues which may 
contribute to a woman becoming mentally ill after giving birth. Research has shown 
that approximately half of women who were convicted of infanticide were not 
suffering from an ‘identifiable mental disorder’.43 The suggestion here is not that 
social circumstances should contribute to a defence for the woman who kills her 
infant, merely that there should be recognition of other factors, beyond childbirth and 
lactation, which can contribute to a deterioration in mental health.44 As will be 
suggested later, the better defence under these circumstances should be diminished 
responsibility or a properly drafted insanity defence. 
 
A response to the feminist accusation that all women are viewed as unstable as a 
consequence of their biology is that it may be an overstatement to claim that the 
phrasing of the infanticide offence pathologises all mothers.45 Ogle and Maier 
suggest46 that as only women can experience pregnancy and childbirth, ‘illnesses 
associated with these phenomena must inevitably be unique to women. This does 
                                                          
42 Brennan, above n.5 at 124. See also Loughnan, above n.1, 35: ‘the infanticidal woman's abnormality is 
depicted as less dangerous or not dangerous at all. In addition, an infanticidal woman's difference is 
naturalized, and,…is depicted as a product of her physiology, something which all women share’. 
43 P d’Orban, ‘Women who Kill their Children’ (1979) 134 British Journal of Psychiatry 560, cited in Morris and 
Wilczynski above n.33 at 35. 
44 See R Roth, ‘Biology and the Deep History of Homicide’ (2011) British Journal of Criminology 535, 539: 
‘Chronic stress and social isolation…lead to physical responses that diminish maternal investment and increase 
the risk of maternal neglect and abuse.’ 
45 Above n.22 at 111. Cunliffe refers to the Canadian model of infanticide which is based on the English 
provision. 
46 Above n.3 at 906. 
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not imply inferiority’. Using a 1987 epidemiological study,47 they demonstrate that 
admission to hospital for psychosis was 22 times higher during the 30 days after 
giving birth. Nevertheless, ‘there is some evidence to suggest that women who killed 
their newborn infants were sometimes perceived…to have been mentally weak, 
distressed or disturbed.’48 This out-dated rationale needs rethinking.  
 
The appeal of this medicalised approach is that it allows for ‘a lenient response for 
the infanticide offender without opening the floodgates to other killers or interfering 
with fundamental criminal law principles in relation to individual responsibility.’49 The 
woman’s behaviour could thus be explained and distinguished from other offenders 
by the fact that she had recently given birth.50 While fundamental criminal law 
principles may not have been sacrificed in order to show leniency to such a 
defendant, a sound underpinning rationale for the offence/defence of infanticide is 
absent. Of greatest concern is the notion that ‘abnormality is...functioning to 
inculpate the individual woman charged with infanticide,’51 A principled approach to 
the offence of infanticide is clearly lacking if it can be defined by proof of a woman’s 
unstable mental condition.  
 
Sanctity of life 
While the inclusive nature of the offence of infanticide places its existence on shaky 
foundations and creates an arguably misogynistic view of motherhood, a similar 
negative value is placed on the life of an infant under 12 months. Despite one view 
                                                          
47 R E Kendall, JC Chalmers and C Platz, ‘Epidemiology of Puerperal Psychoses’ (1987) 150 Brit J of Psychiatry 
662, cited in Ogle, above n.3 at 907. 
48 Brennan, above n.5 at 131. 
49 Ibid at 127. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Above n.1 32. 
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that ‘killing infants cause[s] a minimum of harm’,52 in allowing a mother who kills her 
infant to be charged with the offence of infanticide, a lower value is placed 
incontrovertibly on the life of an infant under 12 months.53 This seems morally wrong, 
outdated and no longer apt in a society proclaiming to protect ‘the defenceless and 
innocent’.54 Unlike English law, the Irish infanticide law does not allow for a charge of 
infanticide in the first instance, favouring instead a murder charge.55 Concerns in 
Ireland were that the infanticide legislation should not ‘diminish the value of infant 
life, or, in connection with this, the deterrent effect of the criminal law.’56 This 
deviation by the Irish Parliament was viewed as ‘a good compromise between the 
need to achieve particular practical and humanitarian objectives, while respecting a 
significant aspect of Catholic, and indeed wider Christian, teaching.’57 In fact, if the 
defence of infanticide is to be retained in English and Welsh law, an initial murder 
charge which can be reduced at trial to an infanticide conviction may be more 
apposite, paying due respect to the sanctity of all lives in being. 
 
Clearly, without such respect being paid, the English offence of infanticide risks 
dulling the ‘bright line’58 between the value of a new-born infant and that of the 
unborn foetus. While the issue of ‘personhood’ has been provocatively discussed in 
the context of abortion law,59 no clear rationale is provided for treating the new-born 
                                                          
52 Above n.26 at 102-103, citing Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Alfred A Knopf, 1957), 29-
30. 
53 Above n.8 at 506. 
54 Above n.3 at 903. 
55 S.1(1) Infanticide Act 1949. 
56 Brennan, above n.5 at 101. 
57 Ibid at 120. 
58  A Burin, ‘Beyond Pragmatism: Defending the ‘Bright Line’ of Birth’ (2014) Medical Law Review 494 at 497: ‘A 
bright line is drawn by law at birth for ascription of the rights flowing from personhood.’ 
59 See, e.g., K Greaseley, ‘Prenatal Personhood and Life’s Intrinsic Value’ (2016) Legal Theory 124. 
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infant as less deserving of protection than other persons in being.60 This inequality is 
most evident when considering that, while suffering from an imbalance of the mind, a 
woman who kills her offspring would be charged with the murder of her 13 month 
child, but infanticide of a child below 12 months. The sanctity of life debate in relation 
to infanticide needs to be given recognition. As Grossman states:61 ‘[i]t may appear 
fair to exculpate mothers suffering from postpartum psychosis, but what about the 
child victims? Who protects their rights?’ It no longer seems appropriate to use an 
offence, the origins of which stem from the low value placed on infant life during the 
19th century, at a time where there was high infant mortality62 combined with the 
stigma of illegitimacy. Given that the offence of infanticide was aimed, silently, at 
social rather than medical circumstances, as Brennan suggests, ‘the medical basis 
of infanticide legislation is a legal invention.’63 
 
Clearly, the lack of reverence for an infant’s life, where she is killed by her mother, is 
based more on the culpability of the mother64 than the harm to the infant. That this 
should be the case may be, in part, attributable to the continued existence of the 
mandatory life sentence for murder. The offence/defence of infanticide, like 
diminished responsibility, serves as ‘a device for circumventing the embarrassments 
that flow from a mandatory sentence.’65 Historically, infanticide allowed for the death 
penalty to be avoided more honestly.66  
 
                                                          
60 Although Greaseley provides a challenging discussion on the diminishing differences between a late-term 
foetus and a neonate: ibid at 150-152. 
61 Above n.36 at 344. 
62 Above n.8 at 522. 
63 Above n.8 at 533. 
64 S Eldar, ‘The Limits of Transferred Malice’ (2012) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 633 at 642-643. 
65 S Dell, ‘Diminished Responsibility Reconsidered’ [1982] Crim LR 809 at 814. 
66 Above at n.10, at para. 8.13. 
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Of note is the fact that the Infanticide Act was passed prior to the availability of the 
diminished responsibility defence.67 The problem with using the defence of 
diminished responsibility in place of the infanticide defence is that a link to a 
recognised medical condition adds an additional burden to a woman who might be in 
denial about her mental state,68 and often has no memory of the killing. MacKay, in 
his research for the Law Commission,69 suggests that it is possible that a verdict of 
infanticide might be triggered in the cases of some defendants suffering from a 
‘dissociative disorder’ where it would be ‘less likely’ to succeed in a defence of 
diminished responsibility. This may be so, but given that any defence which reduces 
a defendant’s level of culpability should be robustly defensible, the absence of a link 
to a recognised medical condition should be a cause of concern. These issues will 
be addressed in relation to the defence of infanticide below. 
 
THE DEFENCE OF INFANTICIDE 
Having examined infanticide and its inclusive nature as an offence, the exclusive 
nature of the defence requires consideration. This will be followed by discussion of 
the absence of a causal link. If the defence of infanticide is used successfully, the 
woman need not prove a mental disorder, nor that any link existed between her 
disturbance of the mind and killing.70 
 
Section 1(2) of the Infanticide Act 1938 states:  
Where upon the trial of a woman for the murder [or manslaughter] of her child, 
being a child under the age of twelve months, the jury are of opinion that she 
                                                          
67 Above n.24, 681. 
68 Above n.10 at para. 8.44. 
69 Ibid, at para. D.37. 
70 Above n.31 at 29. 
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by any wilful act or omission caused its death, but that at the time of the act or 
omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having 
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the 
effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then the jury may… 
return…a verdict of infanticide. 
 
The term ‘infanticide’ is contradictory to its function as a ‘defence’. The origins of the 
term are based in the language of killing, the suffix ‘-cide’ originating from the Latin 
term ‘occido’, meaning to kill, to murder or to slay. The term infanticide as a defence 
is therefore a misnomer. A defence by its nature ought not to be inculpatory,71 nor 
should it apply exclusively to only one small section of society. 
 
The exclusive nature of the defence 
A mother who kills her new-born baby as well as her 13 month old child may be 
charged with infanticide in respect of her new-born infant but will have to be charged 
with murder of her older child (although she may plead diminished responsibility as a 
defence); equally, a father who kills his new-born baby and who has undergone 
many of the same environmental problems as the mother will be subjected to a 
murder charge, as would the mother of an adopted infant. The arbitrary nature of 
these divisions has been acknowledged by the Law Commission72 but no alternative 
recommendations were made. Thus, while the offence of infanticide targets only a 
certain type of defendant, the defence of infanticide is not available to the type of 
defendant who may be deserving of a reduction in culpability due to circumstances 
                                                          
71 Above n.1 32. 
72 Above n.10 at para. 8.13. 
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other than the ‘effect of giving birth’. Additionally, the fact that the woman need show 
no causal link between a recognised medical condition and the killing clearly 
demonstrates that a principled approach to the defence of infanticide is absent. 
Whether the different treatment of women who have recently given birth is justifiable 
must be considered. 
 
There is a limited amount of research suggesting that the medical connection 
between childbirth/lactation73 allows for a distinction to be made between the 
‘infanticidal’ mother and other types of defendant. The reasons behind the need for 
this distinction seem, at best, to be historical. Written about at length,74 the historical 
need for the defence of infanticide has long since disappeared and a new rationale 
for infanticide needs to be sought. The society into which the infanticide legislation 
was originally introduced insisted on ‘female virtue, and was intolerant of 
illegitimacy’.75 The defence of infanticide has developed in a dishonest manner: the 
true reasons for its existence are not openly recognised, namely, the avoidance of 
the death penalty/mandatory life sentence, the distaste of judges, juries and 
prosecutors at the harsh outcome of a murder conviction and the need for mercy to 
be shown,76 and the social circumstances of a woman which fall short of a 
recognisable mental illness. Although a necessary defence historically, it is likely that 
a more open approach to the reasons for the defence and ‘express recognition of the 
socio-economic explanation for infanticide would have been impossible’77 to 
                                                          
73 Ibid at para 8.26: a link may have been found. Nevertheless, ‘the bulk of medical opinion supports an 
aetiology based on social and psychological factors’. (Brennan, above n.8 at 509). 
74 For an excellent historical account of the development of infanticide as an offence/defence, see Loughnan, 
above n.37 at 685-701. 
75 Brennan, above n.5 at 106. 
76 Brennan, above n.5 at 106-108. 
77 Ibid at 136. 
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successfully legislate. The historical need for a lenient approach to these women, in 
the absence of a defence of diminished responsibility, may explain to an extent why 
there was no requirement of a causal link between the killing and the disturbance of 
the mind. This flexible approach no longer seems appropriate. 
 
The Absence of a Causal Link 
While the woman who pleads infanticide as a defence must be able to show that the 
balance of her mind was disturbed at the time of the killing, there is no requirement 
that she should demonstrate she was suffering from an identifiable mental disorder, 
nor that the imbalance caused her to kill. The absence of a causal link allows for the 
merciful outcome discussed earlier but runs contrary to the other mental condition 
defences. The defence of insanity requires a link between a ‘disease of the mind’ 
and the defendant either not knowing the nature and quality of his act or that it was 
wrong.78 The partial defence of diminished responsibility requires a defendant to 
have been suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which arose from a 
recognised medical condition and provides an explanation for the defendant’s 
killing.79 In order to satisfy either of these defences, a defendant has to not only fulfil 
the criteria within them, but also satisfy the court that her actions were caused by 
either a disease of the mind or recognised medical condition. The absence of this 
causal link within the infanticide defence, admittedly, makes the defence more 
compassionate for women who kill their infants in desperate circumstances, 
however, perhaps tips the balance too far away from the harm caused in favour of 
the reduced culpability of the defendant. 
                                                          
78 M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200. 
79 S.2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 as amended by s.52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
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The focus ought to be on a woman’s mental health. Without an honest link to mental 
disorder, infanticide cases will continue to be decided in an unprincipled manner and 
it is possible that there will be more cases decided in the same, prima facie, 
unpredictable manner as Tunstill and Balogh. While Mackay points out80 that the 
Court of Appeal in Sainsbury81 believed there should continue to be leniency shown 
in cases of infanticide,82 respectfully, leniency without a sound underpinning rationale 
risks perpetuating a patronising view of women who kill their children at the same 
time as devaluing the harm caused to society. 
 
Before examining reform proposals, what must first be considered are the 
circumstances under which a woman who kills her infant should be entitled to a 
defence. While the offence/defence of infanticide has merit on a practical level,83 it is 
submitted here that these circumstances should be referable on a theoretical level to 
either reduced culpability or a total absence of criminal responsibility. In order first to 
be held criminally responsible, she must still be a moral agent.  
 
Moral agency and reduced culpability  
A principled approach to the defence of infanticide needs first to determine whether 
the woman is a moral agent. Loughnan suggests that the ‘leniency following a 
conviction for infanticide (spilling over to manslaughter where the facts are 
                                                          
80 Above n.31 at 30. 
81 [1990] Crim LR 348. 
82 (1989) 11 Cr. App. R. (S.) 533, 534-5. Per Russell LJ: ‘of 59 cases of infanticide recorded in the last 10 years, 
between 1979 and 1988, not one has resulted in a custodial sentence. There have been 52 orders either of 
probation or supervision, six hospital orders, one of which was restricted. That then affords the pattern of 
sentencing for this type of offence during the last 10 years.’ 
83 Above n.8 at 517. 
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comparable) strongly suggests that defendants are viewed with a high level of 
sympathy and compassion, and that the infanticide defendant is regarded as less 
dangerous than other killers.’84 This view is supported in Mackay’s sample study of 
47 defendants who had killed very young children.85 Mackay’s findings were that the 
female defendants were viewed as ‘tragic cases’86 and dealt with more leniently than 
the male defendants who were perceived as being more culpable. Compassion has 
clearly been the reason for the defence, and Loughnan suggests87 that this 
continues to be the case. Compassion on its own should not suffice for any defence: 
principled grounds for exculpation should first be found. An exculpatory defence 
should arise due to a total lack of moral agency. A partial defence should arise 
where the woman is a moral agent, and therefore criminally responsible, but there 
are factors which reduce her level of culpability. 
 
Capacity theory suggests that culpability arises as a consequence of both the 
capacity to choose and fair opportunity to comply with the law.88 While a woman may 
lack the capacity to choose due to the ‘effects of childbirth’ and, as such, ought not to 
be viewed as a moral agent, the effects of childbirth per se are not a sufficiently 
sound rationale for depriving a woman of moral agency. A link should be required to 
a recognised medical condition. The World Health Organisation recognises 
                                                          
84 Above n.1 225. 
85 Above n.31 at 21. 
86 Ibid at 30. 
87 Above n.37 at 710, citing the cases of Sainsbury (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 533 and Lewis (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 
577 as examples. 
88 Above n.21 190-191.  
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puerperal psychosis in paragraph F53 of the International Classification of 
Diseases,89 although cautions that90  
 
[m]ost experts in this field are of the opinion that a clinical picture of puerperal 
psychosis is so rarely (if ever) reliably distinguishable from affective disorder 
or schizophrenia that a special category is not justified.  
 
This advisory note points to a difficulty in accurately diagnosing puerperal psychosis; 
requiring a link to a recognised medical condition might carry the risk of holding 
some women to be criminally responsible who ought not to be so regarded. As 
recently as 2007, Brennan stated:91 ‘it is evident that there is little agreement about 
the causes and status of post-natal mental disturbances’. However, the absence of 
agreement may lead to the erroneous assumption that mental illnesses attributable 
to childbirth do not exist.92 The difficulty in providing a fair and accurate diagnosis is 
illustrated by the jury’s rejection of the defence of diminished responsibility and the 
pending re-trial in Tunstill.93 Nevertheless, difficult cases should not deter the need to 
provide a principled rationale for attributing/denying criminal responsibility. 
 
Where no criminal responsibility can be attributed due to lack of moral agency, any 
criminal conviction seems inappropriate. Under such circumstances, the woman 
should receive a complete defence. However, where moral agency is present but 
                                                          
89 https://icd.codes/icd10cm/F53 (accessed on 17 July 2018). The condition is often alternatively referred to as 
postpartum psychosis and it is suggested that these terms should be read interchangeably. 
90 http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/bluebook.pdf, 19, (accessed on 17 July 2018) 
91 Above n.8 at 513. 
92 Above n.3 at 908. 
93 Above n.12. 
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culpability is reduced, the ‘half-way house’94 of a partial defence may be 
appropriate.95 The denial of moral agency or reduction in culpability should, in either 
instance, be linked to a medical condition. 
 
REFORM PROPOSALS 
The Butler Committee96 recommended the abolition of the offence/defence in favour 
of the further reaching defence of diminished responsibility. The Committee was of 
the opinion that infanticide was rendered redundant by the introduction of the partial 
defence of diminished responsibility.97 In addition, the Committee recognised that 
fathers could suffer similar stresses consequent to birth.98 The Law Commission 
does not share this view, preferring retention of infanticide on the grounds that ‘it is a 
practicable legal solution to a particular set of circumstances’99 and that merging 
infanticide with diminished responsibility would have the effect of elevating the 
offence/defence to second degree murder.100 The prospect of labelling a woman who 
has killed her infant a murderer, despite her suffering from a disturbance of the mind, 
is a patently distasteful proposition but, given that no such reforms have been 
forthcoming, this argument no longer carries weight; nor, in view of the case of 
Tunstill, given that the judge withheld infanticide from the jury, can it be stated that 
the offence/defence remains a consistently practicable legal solution. Neither reason 
appears sufficient to shy away from reform. Abolition in favour of diminished 
                                                          
94 Above n.37 at 705. 
95 Above n.18. 
96 Home Office, Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, Cmnd. 6244 (1975) at para. 19.27. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid at para. 19.23. 
99 Above n.10 at para 8.3. 
100 Ibid at para. 8.36. 
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responsibility would achieve a fairer balance between protection of the victim and of 
the vulnerable defendant. 
 
The need for a more considered rationale behind the defence has been recognised 
by the Law Commission when it stated ‘the partial defences to [murder] do not have 
defensible definitions or a rational structure’.101 Despite this assertion, no changes to 
the definition of infanticide are recommended, with the exception that an expedited 
appeal process was proposed.102 The recommendation here is that the defence of 
infanticide should be abolished.103 Where a woman kills her child, regardless of age, 
and her culpability is diminished, then she should be given the defence of diminished 
responsibility. In a perfect world, where her recognised medical condition is 
sufficiently severe to prevent her from being a moral agent, then she should have 
access to a reformed defence of insanity. The defence of not criminally responsible 
by reason of recognised medical condition proposed by the Law Commission104 
would be ideal. Account should also be taken of the fact that the woman may be 
unwilling to plead either defence and so it should be possible for the judge to order a 
medical examination.105 While Grossman suggests106 that postpartum psychosis has 
the ‘potential for manipulation and abuse’, writing in 1990, the same may no longer 
be true today, since this form of psychosis, although difficult to accurately diagnose, 
is now recognised in the International Classification of Diseases.107  
 
                                                          
101 Ibid at para. 1.70. 
102 Ibid at para. 8.4. 
103 With the proviso that the conviction remains voluntary manslaughter and not second degree murder. 
104 Above n.20 at chapter 4. 
105 Above n.10 at para. 8.46. 
106 Above n.36 at 343. 
107 Above n.89 . 
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CONCLUSION 
An infant under 12 months should be entitled to the same rights and recognition as 
any other person in being. To say otherwise is morally perverse and runs contrary to 
the rest of the criminal law. Unfortunately, a child of this age is in more danger of 
being killed by a parent than at any other age.108 The balance of the current 
offence/defence of infanticide is tipped far more towards the protection of the 
vulnerable defendant than the victim. Nevertheless, it is important to avoid the 
potentially ‘paradoxical result’109 that, in giving women equality before the law, they 
are treated more severely by being viewed as responsible for their actions and ‘a 
gendered understanding of criminal law and justice has yet to be fully realised.’110 In 
an age of political correctness, it is inappropriate and patronising to both inculpate or 
exculpate a woman on the grounds of her having recently given birth. As with other 
areas of the substantive criminal law, however, a sound theoretical underpinning 
needs to be debated prior to the implementation of any reform. The suggestion here 
is that the offence/defence of infanticide should be abolished, and diminished 
responsibility or a newly reformed insanity defence should be used in its stead. 
Whether a partial or total defence should be applied should depend upon whether 
the defendant is not a moral agent and therefore not criminally responsible or 
whether she is a moral agent and criminally responsible but entitled to a reduction in 
her level of culpability. What is also clear is that a greater understanding of 
postpartum psychosis,111 and the impact of such a disorder on pre-existing mental 
disorders, is required in order to enhance our ability to undertake the delicate 
                                                          
108 Above n3 at 903. 
109 Ibid at 912. 
110 Wells, above n.5 at 100. 
111 Above n.36 at 344. 
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balancing act needed in order to protect both vulnerable victim and vulnerable 
defendant in desperate circumstances. 
